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Twin Falls, ID 83301
Telephone: (208) 734-1602
Facsimile: (208) 734-1606
ISB 442
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38
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant

IN

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

WALLY KAY SCHULTZ,
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Comi No. 40353-2012
District Court No. CV-11-662

COMES NO\:V, Petitioner Wally Kay Schultz ("Schultz"), by and tlu-ough his
attorneys of record, Fuller Law Offices, and hereby submits the following Brief in
Suppmi of Petition for Review of the Idaho Court of Appeals' Decision filed in Wally
Kay Schultz v. State of Idaho on December 30, 2013, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule

118.
Schultz alleges that the Idaho Comi of Appeals' Decision has decided a question
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of substance not heretofore determined by the Supreme Comi, has decided a question
probably not in accord with

Supreme Court or

of the United States Supreme Court, and has rendered a decision in conflict with a
previous decision of the Co mi of Appeals.

ARGUlVIENT
On or about August 3, 2006, Appellant, Wally Kay Schultz, (hereinafter referred
to as "Schultz"), \vas charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance, as is set forth in
Case No. CR-2006-2718, in the Fifth Judicial District of the State ofldaho,

111

and for the

County of Minidoka. Said case \vas set for trial at a later date, \vhich \Vas vacated
because of a guilty plea entered by Schultz on or about June 4, 2007.
Schultz was later sentenced on August 13, 2007, to a unified sentence of five (5)
years, which unified sentence was comprised of a minimum (fixed) period of confinement
of five (5) years, followed by an indetem1inate penod of custody of 0 years. Schultz
received credit for time served in the amount of 376 days. (R. pp. 11

124.)

Subsequent to the above proceedings, on or about June 16, 2011, Schultz received
from the Offices of the State Appellate Public Defender a letter, including copies of four
Memoranda sent out by the Idaho State Police, which indicate that as early as 2003,
certain improprieties occuned in at least one of the State's forensic laboratories. (R. pp.
9-15.) One of the Memoranda indicated that on February 24, 2011, ISP Captain Clark
Rollins received an Idaho State Police Administrative Incident Report from ISP Lab
Improvement Manager, Matthew Garnette, regarding Skyler .Anderson. Garnette
evidently alleged that Mr. Anderson maintained an ongoing unauthorized quantity of
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controlled substances and other chemicals for display purposes, outside the practices of
the forensics quality manual, without proper documentation, tracking and auditing.
During yearly audits of the Region V lab facility, Mr. Anderson and others intentionally
hid the unauthorized "display drugs" and other chemicals from auditors to avoid detection
of this practice. Mr. i\nderson personally hid the drugs from auditors on at least four
occasions. (R. p. 138.)
Mr. Anderson's conduct \Vas succmctly stated by Colonel G. Jerry Russell,
Director, Idaho State Po lice, in conespondence dated May 11, 2011, to William Lloyd
Mauk.
"Mr. .A.nderson was complicit over a period of years in deliberately hiding
a box of "show and tell" drugs kept at the ISP Forensic Lab in Pocatello. I
understand that this was part of the training he received from now forn1er
Region 5 lab employees, Don Wyckoff and Rockland McDowell, who
apparently justified to bim as the box being kept as "reference" materials
that would cost money to order from supply companies. Mr. Anderson's
direct participation in the activity concerning this box appears to have
ended in 2008 when he was transfen-ed to toxicology, at which point he
ceased having any direct connection to it. After reading an article that
Region 5 Lab Manager Shaimon Larson sent to Mr. Anderson in 2011, and
knowing that the existence of the unauthorized box could have a negative
effect on the lab's accreditation, Mr. A.nderson reported the existence of
the box to Ms. Larson. Until this disclosure to Ms. Larson, this box and
its contents were kept secreted and hidden from auditors. Mr. Anderson
himself hid this box and its contents on at least four occasions, ai1d he
instructed at least one other lab employee to do the same.
As set f01ih in the Notice of contemplated Disciplinary Action dated April
27, 2011, there are very serious consequences of Mr. A.nderson's actions
that I must consider. First, since he deliberately hid the box of "show and
tell" drugs from lab auditors, numerous times and over a period of years, I
have no choice but to view his actions as repeated purposeful deception.
Second, Mr. Anderson's actions may have caused serious damage to
Region 5 Lab's reputation, and may have even called into question the
accuracy and integrity of the entire ISP Forensic Lab pro grain. Surely Mr.
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Anderson appreciates the devastation to the Idaho criminal justice system
should that happen. Third, .Mr. Anderson's actions could have an adverse
should be acutely aware of this,
effect on Region 5's lab accreditation.
Society of Cnme Laboratory
that
is an
Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board) auditor.
(Please see Exhibit "B".)
Schultz filed a Petition, Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief and Motion and
Affidavit in Support of Appointment of Counsel, on or about the

day of August 2011,

alleging, among other things, that there existed ne\\·ly discovered evidence that would
justify post conviction relief in this matter. ( R. p. 1-25.)
A hearing was conducted on or about June 25, 2012, relative to all pending
motions, and Exhibit A and Office of Professional Standards Administrative Investigation
Packet as Exhibit B \Vere introduced as evidence. (R. pp 191-192.)
That the Court issued an Order Regarding All Pending Motions and Judgment of
Dismissal on or about the l l 1h day of July, 2012. (R. pp. 194-204.) On or about July 25,
2012, Schultz filed a Motion for Reconsideration. (R. pp. 205-213.) The State filed an
Objection to Motion for Reconsideration on or about August 7, 2012. (R. pp. 214-216,)
On or about the lOll' day of August, 2012, the Court entered an Order Denying the
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. (R. pp. 217-224.)
Schultz filed a Notice of Appeal on or about the 20th day of September, 2012. (R.
pp.

.) The Idaho Supreme Comi issued an Order Remanding to District Court on

or about the 24t1i day of September, 2012. (R. p. 228.) The Comi issued a Judgment on
or about the 28 111 day of September, 2012. (R. p. 229.) Schultz then filed an Amended
Notice of Appeal on or about October 5, 2012. (R. pp. 230-233.) Schultz appeal was
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denied on December 30, 2013.
In the Court of Appeals' Decision

Court notes primarily that:

1.

Schultz acknowledged that the u11disclosed mfon11ation \Vas impeachment
evidence, and:

2.

Pursuant to Ruiz, the State had no obligation to disclose the infomrntion
before Schultz pled guilty, and;

3.

Schultz relies on Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). In Giglio,
the United States Supreme Court held that failure to disclose impeaclm1ent
evidence is a potential source of a BracZv violation in a trial setting.
Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153-54. However, Giglio 's application is limited by the
United States Supreme Court decision in Ruiz. There the Court specifically
considered exculpatory impeachment evidence, which Schultz attempts to
rely on:
The constitutional question concerns a federal criminal
defendant's \Vaiver of the right to receive from prosecutors
exculpatory impeachment material--a right that the
Constitution provides as part of its basic "fair trial"
States, 405 U.S. 150, 154,
guarantee .... Giglio v.
92 S. Ct. 763, 31L.Ed.2d104 (1972) (exculpatory
evidence includes "evidence affecting" witness
"credibility," \vhere the witness' "reliability" is likely
"determinative of guilt or mnocence").
Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 628 .

The Court then distinguished the constitutional guarantee to
receive impeachment evidence at trial from receiving it before
pleading guilty and held that the State does not have the same
obligation to disclose where a defendant pleads guilty. Id. at
628-33. Characterizing the undisclosed evidence as exculpatory
impeachment evidence does not bring Schultz outside the
parameters of Ruiz. The Constitution simply does not require tbe
goverm11ent to disclose "material impeachment evidence" prior to
entering a plea agreement with a cnminal defendant. id. at 633.
The District Comi in its Order stated that "impeachment evidence "is special in
relation to the fairness of a trial not in respect to whether a plea is
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" Dun lap v.

State, 141 Idaho 50,
.S.

106 P.3d 376,

(2004) (quoting

629 (2002 )) (emphasis in original). It

v. Ruiz, 536

noted that

goes on to

state
"[i]mpeachment evidence should be vievved in the same manner as
exculpatory evidence." Id, citing United Swtes v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 490 (1985); Pizzuto v. State,
134 Idaho 793, 796, 10 P.3d 742, 745 (2000).
As the District Court has previously noted, '· ... the United States
Constitution does not require the State to disclose material impeachment
infomrntion prior to entering a plea agreement with the defendant. United
v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629, 633, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 2455, 2457, 153

LEd.2d 586, 595, 597 (2002)."
Hov,rever, in State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428,

P.2d 1144 (App. 1994), the

Court stated as follows:
The State also contends that a defendant is entitled to asse1i a Brady
violation only if the defendant's conviction followed a trial and not if the
defendant pleaded guilty. This argument is misplaced, for this Court has
previously held that grounds for withdrawal of a guilty pl ea were shown
where material, exculpatory evidence known to the State had been
withheld from the defendant. State v. Johnson, 120 Idaho 408, 816 P.2d
364 (Ct.App. 1991).[fn6] Although the United States Supreme Court's
decisions have articulated the prosecutor's disclosure obligation as one
essential to ensure a fair trial, Brady, 3 U.S. at
83 S.Ct. at J 1961197; Agurs, 427 D.S. at 108, 96 S.Ct. at 2399-2400, the underlying policy
to uncover truth and ensure that only the
expressed by these opinions
guilty are convicted
applies as well where a guilty plea was entered in
ignorance of material, exculpatory information possessed by the
prosecution. In Bagley, the Supreme Court observed that the purpose of
the Brady rule is "to ensure that a miscaJTiage of justice does not occur,"
Bagley, 473 FS. at 675, 105 S.Ct. at 3379-3380, and in Agurs, the Com1
stated:
[T]hough the attorney for the sovereign must prosecute the
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accused with earnestness and vigor, he must always be
faithful to his client's
interest that "justice shall
be done." He is the "servant of the
, the t\vofold aim of
lS
or innocence suffer."
427 U.S. at 110-11, 96 S.Ct. at 2401, quoting Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). As to the
risk of conviction of the innocent by guilty pleas, the Supreme Court has
stated, "This mode of conviction is no more foolproof than full trials to the
court or to the jury. Accordingly, we take great precautions against
unsound results, and we should continue to do so, whether conviction is by
plea or by trial." Brady v. Unired States, 397 U.S.
758, 90 S.Ct. 1463,
1474, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970).[fn7] In light of these pronouncements of the
Supreme Com1, we see no reason to depart from our decision in Johnson,
w"bich allows relief for violations of the prosecutorial obligation of
disclosure in appropriate circumstances where the conviction was entered
upon a guilty plea.
The validity of a guilty plea is deten11ined by reference to whether it \Vas
voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 .S. 8, 89
397 U.S. at
S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Brady v.
748, 90 S.Ct. at 1468-1469; Carrasco, 117 Idaho at 398,
P.2d at
State v. Rose, 122 Idaho 555, 558, 835 P.2d 1366, 1369. This entails an
inquiry as to whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that
he understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; whether the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to
confront adverse witnesses and to refrain from self-incrimination; and
whether the defendant understood the consequences of pleading guilty.
Carrasco, 117 Idaho at 298, 787 P.2d at 284. Thus, to satisfy
constitutional standards, a guilty plea must not only be voluntary but must
be "done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 748, 90 S.Ct. at
1469. It also must not be a product of "misrepresentation or other
impem1issible conduct by state agents." Id., 397 US. at 757, 90 S.Ct. at
1473. \Vhere misconduct by the state keeps a defendant and his attorney
unaware of circumstances tending to negate the defendant's guilt or to
reduce his culpability, a guilty plea entered in ignorance of those facts may
not be knowing and intelligent though it is othen:vise voluntary.
Accordingly, a Brady v. lvfmyland violation may wainnt setting aside a
guilty plea where the violation calls into question the accuracy of the
adjudication of guilt.
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In the vast majority of cases, 1vhen defendants plead guihy they know full
well whether they in fact committed
offense. If information withheld
by the State relates to a fact that was within the defendant's lmmvledge and
was
the discovery of a BracZv
violation ought not enable the defendant to contest that which he has
already openly admitted. In such circumstances, a violation of the
prosecution's obligation of disclosure does not compromise the truth or
risk conviction of the innocent. Therefore. it is essential to determine
\Vhether the defendant's admissions at the plea hearing fully established his
factual guilt.
The inquiry into the effect of the undisclosed evidence on the plea decision
as discussed in White is essentially the same as an assessment of the
materiality of the evidence. The Brady principle is violated only if the
evidence withheld by the state is both exculpatory and material. Bagley,
473 .S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985);
427 .S. at
107-113, 96 S.Ct. at 2399-2402; Brady, 373 .S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 11961197. "Materiality" for purposes of evaluating a claimed Brady violation is
defined in Bagley:
The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of
the proceeding would have been different. A "reasonable
probability" is a probability sufficient to undern1ine confidence in
the outcome. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at
On a Brady challenge to a guilty plea, the test of materiality is whether
there is a reasonable probability that, but
the state's failure to produce
the information, the defendant would not have entered the plea but instead
v.
, 848 F.2d
would have msisted on going to trial.[fn9]
1312, 1322 (2d Cir. 1988). This is not a subjective investigation into \Vhat
the particular defendant and his counsel actually would have decided, but
an objective assessment, based in part upon the persuasiveness of the
\Vithheld information. Id. See also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59-60, 106
S.Ct. at 370-371.
Schultz would invoke the doctrine set fo1ih m Gardner and Dunlap and ask the
Court to determine wbether or not there is a reasonable probability, but for the State's
failure to produce the information, Schultz would not have entered the plea but instead
would have insisted on going to trial. This is an objective assessment, based in part upon
the part of the persuasiveness of the withheld information. At oral argument before the
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Court of

both counsei asserted that the objective assessment set forth above was

to be the ultimate decision presented to

and

not even reference Gardener.
In United

v. Ruiz, 536 l!.S. 622 (2002), the Court stated as follo\\S:

\iVhen a defendant pleads guilty he or she, of course, forgoes not only a fair
trial, but also other accompanying constitutional guarantees. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 .S.
238, 243 (1969) (pleading guilty implicates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Sixth Amendment right to confront one's accusers, and the Sixth
Amendment right to tnal by jury). Given the seriousness of the matter, the Constitution
insists, among other things, that the defendant enter a guilty plea that is "voluntary" and
that the defendant must make related \:\'aivers "knowing[ly], intelligent[ly], [and] with
sufficient mvareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.''
v.
United States, 397 l!.S. 742, 748 (1970); see also Boykin, supra, at 242.
Schultz would assert that his plea of guilt was not knowing, voluntary and
intelligent given the persuasiveness of the withheld infomrntion. \\There misconduct by
the State keeps a defendant and his attorney una\vare of circumstances tending to negate
tbe defendant's guilt or to reduce his culpability, a guilty plea entered in ignorance of
those facts may not be lmowmg and intelligent, though it is otberwise voluntary.
Therefore, a Brac(v violation may wanant setting aside a guilty plea where the violation
calls into question the accuracy of the adjudication of guilt. Gardner at 434.
Further, Schultz specifically requests that this Court find that the evidence
introduced is exculpatory evidence. In Giglio, the Corni held that "exculpatory evidence
includes "evidence affecting" \Vitness "credibility," where the \Vitness' "reliability" is
likely "detem1inative of guilt or innocence"". Giglio v. United States, 405

.S. 150, 92

S.Ct 763 (1972)
Schultz contends that the evidence presented to the District Court is, in fact,
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impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence. As set forth above, exculpatory
evidence includes impeachment evidence where the witness' reliability is likely
deten11inative of guilt or innocence. Obviously, in any possession of controlled
substances case, the forensic scientist' testimony

detern1ine guilt or i1mocence.

Hypothetically speaking, upon an examination of the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions, a
defendant could meet every single element contained in those instructions for the charge
of possession of controlled substances, with the exception of the determination that the
substance was, in fact, a controlled substance, and not be guilty of the charge. It is not
sufficient to sustain a c01w1ction for possession of a controlled substance where the
substance is not, in fact, a controlled substance. The only witness that can satisfy this
requirement is a forensic scientist, duly qualified, who can reliably report test results.
There can be no other way. Therefore,

witness'

is

or

innocence.
In addition, the evidence is exculpatory for several other reasons. First, according
to

v. A1errell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995), the

testing procedures utilized in a criminal proceeding should be in a form that is commonly
accepted in the scientific community. As the Court is likely aware, analysis of controlled
substances utilizes the Scientific Method. The Scientific Method requires a "controlled"
environment. The evidence submitted at hearing clearly shows that a large quantity of
controlled substances which had been unaccounted was being stored in the roof tiles of
the laboratory. Given that there were no rules or regulations pertaining to the storage of
those drugs, nor their handling, it is entirely possible that the entire forensic laboratory
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l'ias contaminated by the unaccounted for controlled substances. Further, the evidence
demonstrates that there were no set

the amount

substance \vhich was to be taken from each substance for testing purposes, there \\'ere no
rules or regulations concerning the destruction of samples, nor 1vere the forensic analysts
being audited concerning their policies and procedures relating to the

of

controlled substances. It is apparent that there vvas not a controlled environment existing
at the time Schultz' drug sample 1vas tested. The evidence introduced at hearing clearly
demonstrates that said evidence is both impeaching and exculpatory.
CO~CLUSION

Schultz vvould request that the Court make a detern1ination as to whether or not
the test set forth in Gardner should have been utilized, i.e. '·on a Brady challenge to a
but for

guilty plea, the test of materiality is whether there is a reasonable probability

the state's failure to produce the information, the defendant vvould not have entered
plea but instead would have msisted on going to trial. 1vfiller v.

, 848 F.2d 1312,

(2d Cir. 1988). This is not a subjective investigation into vvhat the particular
defendant and his counsel actually would have decided, but an objective assessment,
based in part upon the persuasiveness of the withheld infom1ation. Id. See

Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59-60, 106 S.Ct. at 370-371."

It is difficult to imagine that had Schultz knovm of

findings made by the

Idaho State Police, that he would have entered a plea of guilty. Schultz contends that an
objective person would not have entered a plea of guilty, and would have instead taken
the matter to a trial before a jury of his peers.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW - 11

Therefore, Schultz requests that the Idaho Supreme Court review the decision
issued in this matter and further requests that his plea of

\Vithdrawn

set

aside and the conviction vacated.
DATED This 3

day of January, 2014.
LAW OFFICES

Attorney for Appellant

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the
tv;o true and correct copies of the foregoing document to
postage pre-paid, to the follovving:
Lawrence Vv asden
Idaho Attorney General
P. 0. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
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of January,
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